Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_s2s_keysize_policy/mod_s2s_keysize_policy.lua @ 6092:bd3ff802d883
mod_anti_spam: Fix another traceback for origin sessions without an IP
This is likely to be the case for stanzas originating from local hosts, for
example (so not true s2s). It should be safe to bypass the IP check for those.
| author | Matthew Wild <mwild1@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| date | Sat, 28 Dec 2024 21:02:08 +0000 |
| parents | 27ffa6521d4e |
| children |
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-- mod_s2s_keysize_policy.lua -- Requires LuaSec with this patch: https://github.com/brunoos/luasec/pull/12 module:set_global(); local datetime_parse = require"util.datetime".parse; local pat = "^([JFMAONSD][ceupao][glptbvyncr]) ?(%d%d?) (%d%d):(%d%d):(%d%d) (%d%d%d%d) GMT$"; local months = {Jan=1,Feb=2,Mar=3,Apr=4,May=5,Jun=6,Jul=7,Aug=8,Sep=9,Oct=10,Nov=11,Dec=12}; local function parse_x509_datetime(s) local month, day, hour, min, sec, year = s:match(pat); month = months[month]; return datetime_parse(("%04d-%02d-%02dT%02d:%02d:%02dZ"):format(year, month, day, hour, min, sec)); end local weak_key_cutoff = datetime_parse("2014-01-01T00:00:00Z"); -- From RFC 4492 local weak_key_size = { RSA = 2048, DSA = 2048, DH = 2048, EC = 233, } module:hook("s2s-check-certificate", function(event) local host, session, cert = event.host, event.session, event.cert; if cert and cert.pubkey then local _, key_type, key_size = cert:pubkey(); if key_size < ( weak_key_size[key_type] or 0 ) then local issued = parse_x509_datetime(cert:notbefore()); if issued > weak_key_cutoff then session.log("warn", "%s has a %s-bit %s key issued after 31 December 2013, invalidating trust!", host, key_size, key_type); session.cert_chain_status = "invalid"; session.cert_identity_status = "invalid"; else session.log("warn", "%s has a %s-bit %s key", host, key_size, key_type); end else session.log("info", "%s has a %s-bit %s key", host, key_size, key_type); end end end);
