Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_log_auth/mod_log_auth.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
| author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
| parents | 6d1ec8099315 |
| children |
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local mode = module:get_option_string("log_auth_ips", "failure"); assert(({ all = true, failure = true, success = true })[mode], "Unknown log mode: "..tostring(mode).." - valid modes are 'all', 'failure', 'success'"); if mode == "failure" or mode == "all" then module:hook("authentication-failure", function (event) local session = event.session; local username = session.username or session.sasl_handler and session.sasl_handler.username or "?"; session.log("info", "Failed authentication attempt (%s) for user %s@%s from IP: %s", event.condition or "unknown-condition", username, module.host, session.ip or "?"); end); end if mode == "success" or mode == "all" then module:hook("authentication-success", function (event) local session = event.session; session.log("info", "Successful authentication as %s@%s from IP: %s", session.username, module.host, session.ip or "?"); end); end
