view mod_lib_ldap/dev/t/TestConnection.pm @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 07582b8aaf84
children
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package TestConnection;

use strict;
use warnings;
use parent 'AnyEvent::XMPP::IM::Connection';

use 5.010;

our $HOST         = 'localhost';
our $TIMEOUT      = 5;
our %PASSWORD_FOR = (
    one   => '12345',
    two   => '23451',
    three => '34512',
    four  => '45123',
    five  => '51234',
    six   => '123456',
    seven => '1234567',
);

sub new {
    my ( $class, $username, %options ) = @_;

    my $cond  = AnyEvent->condvar;
    my $timer = AnyEvent->timer(
        after => $TIMEOUT,
        cb    => sub {
            $cond->send('timeout');
        },
    );

    my $self = $class->SUPER::new(
        username => $username,
        domain   => $HOST,
        password => $options{'password'} // $PASSWORD_FOR{$username},
        resource => 'test bot',
    );

    $self->reg_cb(error => sub {
        my ( undef, $error ) = @_;

        $cond->send($error->string);
    });

    bless $self, $class;

    $self->{'condvar'}       = $cond;
    $self->{'timeout_timer'} = $timer;

    $self->connect;

    return $self;
}

sub cond {
    my ( $self ) = @_;

    return $self->{'condvar'};
}

1;