Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_lib_ldap/dev/t/TestConnection.pm @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
| author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
| parents | 07582b8aaf84 |
| children |
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package TestConnection; use strict; use warnings; use parent 'AnyEvent::XMPP::IM::Connection'; use 5.010; our $HOST = 'localhost'; our $TIMEOUT = 5; our %PASSWORD_FOR = ( one => '12345', two => '23451', three => '34512', four => '45123', five => '51234', six => '123456', seven => '1234567', ); sub new { my ( $class, $username, %options ) = @_; my $cond = AnyEvent->condvar; my $timer = AnyEvent->timer( after => $TIMEOUT, cb => sub { $cond->send('timeout'); }, ); my $self = $class->SUPER::new( username => $username, domain => $HOST, password => $options{'password'} // $PASSWORD_FOR{$username}, resource => 'test bot', ); $self->reg_cb(error => sub { my ( undef, $error ) = @_; $cond->send($error->string); }); bless $self, $class; $self->{'condvar'} = $cond; $self->{'timeout_timer'} = $timer; $self->connect; return $self; } sub cond { my ( $self ) = @_; return $self->{'condvar'}; } 1;
