view mod_conformance_restricted/mod_conformance_restricted.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 7dbde05b48a9
children
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-- Prosody IM
-- Copyright (C) 2012 Florian Zeitz
--
-- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the
-- COPYING file in the source package for more information.
--

local st = require "util.stanza";
local jid = require "util.jid";

module:hook("message/host", function (event)
	local origin, stanza = event.origin, event.stanza;
	local node, host, resource = jid.split(stanza.attr.to);
	local body = stanza:get_child_text("body");

	if resource ~= "conformance" then
		return; -- Not interop testing
	end

	if body == "PI" then
		origin.send("<?testing this='out'?>");
	elseif body == "comment" then
		origin.send("<!-- no comment -->");
	elseif body == "DTD" then
		origin.send("<!DOCTYPE greeting [\n<!ENTITY test 'You should not see this'>\n]>");
	elseif body == "entity" then
		origin.send("<message type='chat' to='"..stanza.attr.from.."'><body>&test;</body></message>");
	else
		local reply = st.reply(stanza);
		reply:body("Send me one of: PI, comment, DTD, or entity");
		origin.send(reply);
	end

	return true;
end);