Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_admin_probe/mod_admin_probe.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
| author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
| parents | f78661861e98 |
| children |
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-- Prosody IM -- Copyright (C) 2014 Florian Zeitz -- -- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the -- COPYING file in the source package for more information. -- local presence = module:depends("presence"); local send_presence_of_available_resources = presence.send_presence_of_available_resources; local hosts = prosody.hosts; local core_post_stanza = prosody.core_post_stanza; local st = require "util.stanza"; local is_admin = require "core.usermanager".is_admin; local jid_split = require "util.jid".split; module:hook("presence/bare", function(data) local origin, stanza = data.origin, data.stanza; local to, from, type = stanza.attr.to, stanza.attr.from, stanza.attr.type; local node, host = jid_split(to); if type ~= "probe" then return; end if not is_admin(from, module.host) then return; end if 0 == send_presence_of_available_resources(node, host, from, origin) then core_post_stanza(hosts[host], st.presence({from=to, to=from, type="unavailable"}), true); end return true; end, 10);
