Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_auth_token/token_auth_utils.lib.lua @ 6352:525655adfd3e
mod_report_affiliations: Fix traceback a non-user is sending a presence
For now we won’t touch their presence instead of emiting this traceback:
error Traceback[s2s]: /usr/lib/prosody/core/rostermanager.lua:275: attempt to concatenate a nil value (local 'username')
stack traceback:
/usr/lib/prosody/core/rostermanager.lua:275: in function 'prosody.core.rostermanager.is_user_subscribed'
...ules/mod_report_affiliations/mod_report_affiliations.lua:116: in field '?'
/usr/lib/prosody/util/events.lua:81: in function </usr/lib/prosody/util/events.lua:77>
(...tail calls...)
/usr/lib/prosody/core/stanza_router.lua:184: in upvalue 'core_post_stanza'
/usr/lib/prosody/modules/mod_presence.lua:244: in function </usr/lib/prosody/modules/mod_presence.lua:231>
(...tail calls...)
/usr/lib/prosody/util/events.lua:81: in function </usr/lib/prosody/util/events.lua:77>
(...tail calls...)
/usr/lib/prosody/core/stanza_router.lua:188: in upvalue 'core_post_stanza'
/usr/lib/prosody/core/stanza_router.lua:128: in upvalue 'core_process_stanza'
/usr/lib/prosody/modules/mod_s2s.lua:818: in upvalue 'func'
/usr/lib/prosody/util/async.lua:149: in function </usr/lib/prosody/util/async.lua:147>
| author | Link Mauve <linkmauve@linkmauve.fr> |
|---|---|
| date | Tue, 30 Dec 2025 13:19:43 +0100 |
| parents | 0fb12a4b6106 |
| children |
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local base64 = require "util.encodings".base64; local hmac = require "openssl.hmac"; local luatz = require "luatz"; local otp = require "otp"; local DIGEST_TYPE = "SHA256"; local OTP_DEVIATION = 1; local OTP_DIGITS = 8; local OTP_INTERVAL = 30; local nonce_cache = {}; local function check_nonce(jid, otp_value, nonce) -- We cache all nonces used per OTP, to ensure that a token cannot be used -- more than once. -- -- We assume that the OTP is valid in the current time window. This is the -- case because we only call check_nonce *after* the OTP has been verified. -- -- We only store one OTP per JID, so if a new OTP comes in, we wipe the -- previous OTP and its cached nonces. if nonce_cache[jid] == nil or nonce_cache[jid][otp_value] == nil then nonce_cache[jid] = {} nonce_cache[jid][otp_value] = {} nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] = true return true; end if nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] == true then return false; else nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] = true; return true; end end local function verify_token(username, password, otp_seed, token_secret, log) local totp = otp.new_totp_from_key(otp_seed, OTP_DIGITS, OTP_INTERVAL) local token = string.match(password, "(%d+) ") local otp_value = token:sub(1,8) local nonce = token:sub(9) local signature = base64.decode(string.match(password, " (.+)")) local jid = username.."@"..module.host if totp:verify(otp_value, OTP_DEVIATION, luatz.time()) then log("debug", "The TOTP was verified"); local hmac_ctx = hmac.new(token_secret, DIGEST_TYPE) if signature == hmac_ctx:final(otp_value..nonce..jid) then log("debug", "The key was verified"); if check_nonce(jid, otp_value, nonce) then log("debug", "The nonce was verified"); return true; end end end log("debug", "Verification failed"); return false; end return { OTP_DEVIATION = OTP_DIGITS, OTP_DIGITS = OTP_DIGITS, OTP_INTERVAL = OTP_INTERVAL, DIGEST_TYPE = DIGEST_TYPE, verify_token = verify_token; }
