Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_auth_token/token_auth_utils.lib.lua @ 5193:2bb29ece216b
mod_http_oauth2: Implement stateless dynamic client registration
Replaces previous explicit registration that required either the
additional module mod_adhoc_oauth2_client or manually editing the
database. That method was enough to have something to test with, but
would not probably not scale easily.
Dynamic client registration allows creating clients on the fly, which
may be even easier in theory.
In order to not allow basically unauthenticated writes to the database,
we implement a stateless model here.
per_host_key := HMAC(config -> oauth2_registration_key, hostname)
client_id := JWT { client metadata } signed with per_host_key
client_secret := HMAC(per_host_key, client_id)
This should ensure everything we need to know is part of the client_id,
allowing redirects etc to be validated, and the client_secret can be
validated with only the client_id and the per_host_key.
A nonce injected into the client_id JWT should ensure nobody can submit
the same client metadata and retrieve the same client_secret
| author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
|---|---|
| date | Fri, 03 Mar 2023 21:14:19 +0100 |
| parents | 0fb12a4b6106 |
| children |
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local base64 = require "util.encodings".base64; local hmac = require "openssl.hmac"; local luatz = require "luatz"; local otp = require "otp"; local DIGEST_TYPE = "SHA256"; local OTP_DEVIATION = 1; local OTP_DIGITS = 8; local OTP_INTERVAL = 30; local nonce_cache = {}; local function check_nonce(jid, otp_value, nonce) -- We cache all nonces used per OTP, to ensure that a token cannot be used -- more than once. -- -- We assume that the OTP is valid in the current time window. This is the -- case because we only call check_nonce *after* the OTP has been verified. -- -- We only store one OTP per JID, so if a new OTP comes in, we wipe the -- previous OTP and its cached nonces. if nonce_cache[jid] == nil or nonce_cache[jid][otp_value] == nil then nonce_cache[jid] = {} nonce_cache[jid][otp_value] = {} nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] = true return true; end if nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] == true then return false; else nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] = true; return true; end end local function verify_token(username, password, otp_seed, token_secret, log) local totp = otp.new_totp_from_key(otp_seed, OTP_DIGITS, OTP_INTERVAL) local token = string.match(password, "(%d+) ") local otp_value = token:sub(1,8) local nonce = token:sub(9) local signature = base64.decode(string.match(password, " (.+)")) local jid = username.."@"..module.host if totp:verify(otp_value, OTP_DEVIATION, luatz.time()) then log("debug", "The TOTP was verified"); local hmac_ctx = hmac.new(token_secret, DIGEST_TYPE) if signature == hmac_ctx:final(otp_value..nonce..jid) then log("debug", "The key was verified"); if check_nonce(jid, otp_value, nonce) then log("debug", "The nonce was verified"); return true; end end end log("debug", "Verification failed"); return false; end return { OTP_DEVIATION = OTP_DIGITS, OTP_DIGITS = OTP_DIGITS, OTP_INTERVAL = OTP_INTERVAL, DIGEST_TYPE = DIGEST_TYPE, verify_token = verify_token; }
