Mercurial > prosody-hg
view util/x509.lua @ 13652:a08065207ef0
net.server_epoll: Call :shutdown() on TLS sockets when supported
Comment from Matthew:
This fixes a potential issue where the Prosody process gets blocked on sockets
waiting for them to close. Unlike non-TLS sockets, closing a TLS socket sends
layer 7 data, and this can cause problems for sockets which are in the process
of being cleaned up.
This depends on LuaSec changes which are not yet upstream.
From Martijn's original email:
So first my analysis of luasec. in ssl.c the socket is put into blocking
mode right before calling SSL_shutdown() inside meth_destroy(). My best
guess to why this is is because meth_destroy is linked to the __close
and __gc methods, which can't exactly be called multiple times and
luasec does want to make sure that a tls session is shutdown as clean
as possible.
I can't say I disagree with this reasoning and don't want to change this
behaviour. My solution to this without changing the current behaviour is
to introduce a shutdown() method. I am aware that this overlaps in a
conflicting way with tcp's shutdown method, but it stays close to the
OpenSSL name. This method calls SSL_shutdown() in the current
(non)blocking mode of the underlying socket and returns a boolean
whether or not the shutdown is completed (matching SSL_shutdown()'s 0
or 1 return values), and returns the familiar ssl_ioerror() strings on
error with a false for completion. This error can then be used to
determine if we have wantread/wantwrite to finalize things. Once
meth_shutdown() has been called once a shutdown flag will be set, which
indicates to meth_destroy() that the SSL_shutdown() has been handled
by the application and it shouldn't be needed to set the socket to
blocking mode. I've left the SSL_shutdown() call in the
LSEC_STATE_CONNECTED to prevent TOCTOU if the application reaches a
timeout for the shutdown code, which might allow SSL_shutdown() to
clean up anyway at the last possible moment.
Another thing I've changed to luasec is the call to socket_setblocking()
right before calling close(2) in socket_destroy() in usocket.c.
According to the latest POSIX[0]:
Note that the requirement for close() on a socket to block for up to
the current linger interval is not conditional on the O_NONBLOCK
setting.
Which I read to mean that removing O_NONBLOCK on the socket before close
doesn't impact the behaviour and only causes noise in system call
tracers. I didn't touch the windows bits of this, since I don't do
windows.
For the prosody side of things I've made the TLS shutdown bits resemble
interface:onwritable(), and put it under a combined guard of self._tls
and self.conn.shutdown. The self._tls bit is there to prevent getting
stuck on this condition, and self.conn.shutdown is there to prevent the
code being called by instances where the patched luasec isn't deployed.
The destroy() method can be called from various places and is read by
me as the "we give up" error path. To accommodate for these unexpected
entrypoints I've added a single call to self.conn:shutdown() to prevent
the socket being put into blocking mode. I have no expectations that
there is any other use here. Same as previous, the self.conn.shutdown
check is there to make sure it's not called on unpatched luasec
deployments and self._tls is there to make sure we don't call shutdown()
on tcp sockets.
I wouldn't recommend logging of the conn:shutdown() error inside
close(), since a lot of clients simply close the connection before
SSL_shutdown() is done.
| author | Martijn van Duren <martijn@openbsd.org> |
|---|---|
| date | Thu, 06 Feb 2025 15:04:38 +0000 |
| parents | d10957394a3c |
| children | b50eadfddd57 |
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-- Prosody IM -- Copyright (C) 2010 Matthew Wild -- Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Aurich -- -- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the -- COPYING file in the source package for more information. -- -- TODO: I feel a fair amount of this logic should be integrated into Luasec, -- so that everyone isn't re-inventing the wheel. Dependencies on -- IDN libraries complicate that. -- [TLS-CERTS] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125.html -- [XMPP-CORE] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6120.html -- [SRV-ID] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4985.html -- [IDNA] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890.html -- [LDAP] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4519.html -- [PKIX] - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280.html local nameprep = require "prosody.util.encodings".stringprep.nameprep; local idna_to_ascii = require "prosody.util.encodings".idna.to_ascii; local idna_to_unicode = require "prosody.util.encodings".idna.to_unicode; local base64 = require "prosody.util.encodings".base64; local log = require "prosody.util.logger".init("x509"); local mt = require "prosody.util.multitable"; local s_format = string.format; local ipairs = ipairs; local _ENV = nil; -- luacheck: std none local oid_commonname = "2.5.4.3"; -- [LDAP] 2.3 local oid_subjectaltname = "2.5.29.17"; -- [PKIX] 4.2.1.6 local oid_xmppaddr = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"; -- [XMPP-CORE] local oid_dnssrv = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"; -- [SRV-ID] -- Compare a hostname (possibly international) with asserted names -- extracted from a certificate. -- This function follows the rules laid out in -- sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 of [TLS-CERTS] -- -- A wildcard ("*") all by itself is allowed only as the left-most label local function compare_dnsname(host, asserted_names) -- TODO: Sufficient normalization? Review relevant specs. local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) if norm_host == nil then log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host) return false end norm_host = norm_host:lower() local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label for i=1,#asserted_names do local name = asserted_names[i] if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); return true end -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" if name:match("^%*%.") then local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); return true end end end return false end -- Compare an XMPP domain name with the asserted id-on-xmppAddr -- identities extracted from a certificate. Both are UTF8 strings. -- -- Per [XMPP-CORE], matches against asserted identities don't include -- wildcards, so we just do a normalize on both and then a string comparison -- -- TODO: Support for full JIDs? local function compare_xmppaddr(host, asserted_names) local norm_host = nameprep(host) for i=1,#asserted_names do local name = asserted_names[i] -- We only want to match against bare domains right now, not -- those crazy full-er JIDs. if name:match("[@/]") then log("debug", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s because it's not a bare domain", name) else local norm_name = nameprep(name) if norm_name == nil then log("info", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s, failed nameprep!", name) else if norm_host == norm_name then log("debug", "Cert xmppAddr %s matched hostname", name) return true end end end end return false end -- Compare a host + service against the asserted id-on-dnsSRV (SRV-ID) -- identities extracted from a certificate. -- -- Per [SRV-ID], the asserted identities will be encoded in ASCII via ToASCII. -- Comparison is done case-insensitively, and a wildcard ("*") all by itself -- is allowed only as the left-most non-service label. local function compare_srvname(host, service, asserted_names) local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) if norm_host == nil then log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host); return false end -- Service names start with a "_" if service:match("^_") == nil then service = "_"..service end norm_host = norm_host:lower(); local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label for i=1,#asserted_names do local asserted_service, name = asserted_names[i]:match("^(_[^.]+)%.(.*)"); if service == asserted_service then if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); return true; end -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" if name:match("^%*%.") then local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name) return true end end if norm_host == name:lower() then log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); return true end end end return false end local function verify_identity(host, service, cert) if cert.setencode then cert:setencode("utf8"); end local ext = cert:extensions() if ext[oid_subjectaltname] then local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname]; -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 6.3, 6.4.4, "a client MUST NOT seek a match for a -- reference identifier if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID -- SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types" local had_supported_altnames = false if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then had_supported_altnames = true if service == "_xmpp-client" or service == "_xmpp-server" then if compare_xmppaddr(host, sans[oid_xmppaddr]) then return true end end end if sans[oid_dnssrv] then had_supported_altnames = true -- Only check srvNames if the caller specified a service if service and compare_srvname(host, service, sans[oid_dnssrv]) then return true end end if sans["dNSName"] then had_supported_altnames = true if compare_dnsname(host, sans["dNSName"]) then return true end end -- We don't need URIs, but [TLS-CERTS] is clear. if sans["uniformResourceIdentifier"] then had_supported_altnames = true end if had_supported_altnames then return false end end -- Extract a common name from the certificate, and check it as if it were -- a dNSName subjectAltName (wildcards may apply for, and receive, -- cat treats) -- -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 1.8, a CN-ID is the Common Name from a cert subject -- which has one and only one Common Name local subject = cert:subject() local cn = nil for i=1,#subject do local dn = subject[i] if dn["oid"] == oid_commonname then if cn then log("info", "Certificate has multiple common names") return false end cn = dn["value"]; end end if cn then -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 6.4.4, follow the comparison rules for dNSName SANs. return compare_dnsname(host, { cn }) end -- If all else fails, well, why should we be any different? return false end -- TODO Support other SANs local function get_identities(cert) --> map of names to sets of services if cert.setencode then cert:setencode("utf8"); end local names = mt.new(); local ext = cert:extensions(); local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname]; if sans then if sans["dNSName"] then -- Valid for any service for _, name in ipairs(sans["dNSName"]) do local is_wildcard = name:sub(1, 2) == "*."; if is_wildcard then name = name:sub(3); end name = idna_to_unicode(nameprep(name)); if name then if is_wildcard then name = "*." .. name; end names:set(name, "*", true); end end end if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then for _, name in ipairs(sans[oid_xmppaddr]) do name = nameprep(name); if name then names:set(name, "xmpp-client", true); names:set(name, "xmpp-server", true); end end end if sans[oid_dnssrv] then for _, srvname in ipairs(sans[oid_dnssrv]) do local srv, name = srvname:match("^_([^.]+)%.(.*)"); if srv then name = nameprep(name); if name then names:set(name, srv, true); end end end end end local subject = cert:subject(); for i = 1, #subject do local dn = subject[i]; if dn.oid == oid_commonname then local name = nameprep(dn.value); if name and idna_to_ascii(name) then names:set(name, "*", true); end end end return names.data; end local pat = "%-%-%-%-%-BEGIN ([A-Z ]+)%-%-%-%-%-\r?\n".. "([0-9A-Za-z+/=\r\n]*)\r?\n%-%-%-%-%-END %1%-%-%-%-%-"; local function pem2der(pem) local typ, data = pem:match(pat); if typ and data then return base64.decode(data), typ; end end local wrap = ('.'):rep(64); local envelope = "-----BEGIN %s-----\n%s\n-----END %s-----\n" local function der2pem(data, typ) typ = typ and typ:upper() or "CERTIFICATE"; data = base64.encode(data); return s_format(envelope, typ, data:gsub(wrap, '%0\n', (#data-1)/64), typ); end return { verify_identity = verify_identity; get_identities = get_identities; pem2der = pem2der; der2pem = der2pem; };
